

Abstracts

Theme 2: Colonial Approaches to Empire and Nation States

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Indonesian nationalism from afar: A reinterpretation of the concept of *Long Distance Nationalism*

1. Tjalling Bouma

Divide and rule? A critical approach to the historiography of Federal Indonesia

This paper is part of a research project titled *The United States of Indonesia, Rise and Fall of a Federal State 1941-1950*. This is an international comparative study into the rise and fall of the federal state structure of Indonesia. Firstly, it examines the motives and interests within and outside Indonesia which led to the new state structure in 1946. Secondly, it explores the coming into being of the United States of Indonesia between 1946 and 1949. Thirdly, it studies the transition to a unitary state in the nine months between December 1949 and August 1950.

On December 27, 1949 sovereignty was transferred from the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia. Within a few weeks several states in the federation began to be merged with the Republic of Indonesia, based in Yogyakarta. Eight months later, the federation collapsed completely and the unitary republic of Indonesia was proclaimed. The road to federation only had begun in 1946 in the middle of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, the main architect being Van Mook, the highest Dutch official in Indonesia at the time.

In a publication by the Indonesian embassy in the Netherlands in 2002 titled *Van proclamatie tot onwankelbare eenheidsstaat* (From proclamation to unshakable unitary state) the official state doctrine is clearly shown: Federalism is (to be) regarded in history as an attempt to undermine Indonesia. Historiography seems to agree with this doctrine. J. De Kadt started this tradition in 1949, when he named the federal states puppet states. Followed by C. Smit (1952), Kahin (1952), and Alers (1956), there seem to be only slight changes in attitude. Reid (1974) calls the state of East Indonesia a “lame piece of window dressing”.¹ Ricklefs (1981) seems to abstain from moral judgements on this subject but mentions federalism suspect “obvious origins as a Dutch stratagem”.² In 1963, deeply offended by the way public opinion had despised his policies, Van Mook accused his critics of having deformed his plans in a reactionary way, while they were meant “as a solution to regional differences in the Indonesian state and outlet for nationalism outside the Republic”.³

In this paper on the historiography of the subject, I will examine critically the construction of this view of federalism as a Dutch strategy of divide and rule, shared among both historians, posited in school text books and integrated into the canon of Indonesian state formation. Why are historians and politicians seeming to repeat each other? Do they all share the same argumentation and focus on the same historical figures? What kind of historical sources are being used? Have all the participants in the federal story being listened to?

I expect my research to be an opening up of the historical debate on this subject. In this optimistic approach I feel supported by Van den Doel (2000), who cautiously

¹ Reid, 109.

² Ricklefs, 269.

³ Daalder, 472.

seems to predict a possible end of the 'federal taboo' after the fall of the Suharto regime.

2. Filippo Espinoza

The relation between the Italian administration over the Aegean Archipelago and the fascist expansionism.

The history of the Italian Dodecanese has attracted a mounting interest during the last decade. A picture full of peculiarities is emerging, due to the Possession characteristics, i.e. an extra metropolitan territory inhabited by white populations, with no chances to establish, as in the African colonies, either an ethnic difference or a cultural inferiority when compared to the Italian rulers .

Moreover, the Aegean territory was annexed to the Italian Kingdom only after twelve years of military occupation that were expected to end by returning the islands to the Ottoman Empire or giving the Archipelago to Greece in exchange for the recognition of a "zone of influence" in Anatolia. This plan was frustrated by the dramatic international framework: the military occupation, which took place during the Italo-Turkish War, comes a few months before the Balkan Wars, followed by World War I, the death of the Ottoman Empire, the rise of Kemalism in Turkey and of Fascism in Italy. In addition to this, the Dodecanesian irredentist requests were supported by another European country: Greece.

These conditions are reflected into a completely unique administrative framework, and in the difficulties encountered by the Italian courts to clarify the theoretical basis of the nature of the territory and its inhabitants, finding previous models in international law and in the experiences of other imperial European powers. Even after the annexation the Ottoman law did not expire in the Aegean territory, and the inhabitants were given a special type of Italian citizenship that provided for the exemption from military obligations and lacked political rights. The Aegean citizens, unlike the colonial subjects, were allowed to acquire the full citizenship by voluntarily serving in the army. The administrative apparatus were owned by a Governor who, having inherited the prerogatives of the military predecessors, exercised "full civil powers" and responded only to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The local government had its own budget, not subject to revision, through which it managed both the local resources and the metropolitan contributions.

Despite the large administrative freedom and the large funds received by the fascist government to support the local development, the Aegean Possession was first of all a cost: it is sufficient to notice that between 1928 and 1932 the volume of imports was ten times higher than that of exports.

Yet since the mid-thirties the investments granted to the local administration, increased, and in 1936 the Governor benefited from an increase in his prerogatives as he was also invested with "full military powers".

Under this apparent contradiction is the fact that the Dodecanese represented for Fascism a natural link between Europe, the Middle East and Africa; it bore a politic, strategic and military function, all of great importance for the expansion to the East. This paper wish to approach the relationship between the local administrative policy and the fascist expansionism.

3. Hans van de Jagt

Neo-Calvinism, politics and race in the Dutch East Indies, 1900-1920

There is a historiographical tension on the relation of Dutch neo-Calvinism and the politics on race-issues (race as a cultural phenomenon). In the context of South-African apartheid, historians often relate neo-Calvinism and views on race. And indeed, apartheid partly had, according to some South African proponents of this policy, its origins in the pluralistic principles of theologian and politician Abraham Kuyper, the founding father of Dutch neo-Calvinism. In their view race-homogeneity is an ultimate form of the Kuyperian sphere-sovereignty.

The debate on neo-Calvinism and race takes place exclusively in the context of South-Africa. As a result, the role of neo-Calvinism in the 'real' colonies of Dutch modern history remains unaddressed in this debate. Little attention has been paid to the case of Dutch neo-Calvinism in the West- and East Indies. Of course, there is a large historiographical discourse on Protestant mission in these Indies, but those studies are mainly 'mission-minded', without focussing on the political ideas that undergird neo-Calvinism and without analyzing this system in a colonial context of the Indies. This is interesting, especially when one keeps in mind that a substantial part of colonial politics in the period 1900-1920 has been formulated and executed by neo-Calvinists.

In the East- and West-Indies many Protestant and Catholic missionaries tried to spread Christian religion. Due the Dutch liberal principle of separation between Church and State, missionaries had little public influence and played a marginal role in society and in the political debate. In 1896 Kuyper proposed and formulated rules for church planting-projects in the Dutch East Indies, the main Dutch Protestant mission field. At the same time the Dutch reformed theologian Herman Bavinck wrote about mission in colonial areas. Both influential Reformed leaders affected the young Dutch army-officer A.W.F. Idenburg. In *De Heraut*, Kuypers weekly newspaper, Idenburg had written some articles on mission, military defence, church planting and race-issues in which he manifested and explained his ideas. Idenburg became a new 'Indië-specialist' for the Reformed political party ARP. But what happened with these ideas when this same Idenburg came into political power in 1901 as MP and in 1902 as minister of Colonial Affairs and stayed in politics until the mid twenties (as a governor-general, minister and senator)? To what extent was he able to apply neo-Calvinist ideas on race and race-diversity in the colonial policy and practise?

In this paper my main question is: How did the neo-Calvinist view on race affect the Dutch colonial policy between 1900 and 1920? My paper focuses on the correlation of politics, religious ideas and race. I explore the tensions between neo-Calvinism and colonial race-politics in the Dutch Indies, and show the distinction between Kuyperian theoretical ideals and Idenburgian politics of practise. The paper provides a reflection on the Dutch colonial policy from an orthodox-Protestant perspective.

4. Melek Maksudoglu

Minorities in their homeland; The Crimean Tatars

On the eve of joining to European Union, Ukraine has faced a threat to division among its civilians. The demise of the Soviet Union brought multidimensional problems to the former republics of USSR and Ukraine could not escape from the lingering old problems. Russia argued that Crimea was always a part of Russia and should be under Russian rule, hold a referendum although most of the nations did not accept, came under Russian rule once again in March 2014. The Crimean Tatars, currently 12 percent of the Crimean population, went through the deportation faced yet the second ethnic cleansing. So, who are the Crimean Tatars and what is the Crimean Tatar heritage? Why the Crimean Tatars' influence, as minority in their own lands, is crucial in policy making in Ukraine and Russian conflict? In, 1991, the Crimean Tatar leadership founded the Qurultay (Parliament), to act as a representative body for the Crimean Tatars, which addresses grievances to the Ukrainian central government. After the occupation of Russia, Qurultay has met and claimed greater rights to self-government in Crimea while Russian rule as colonizers. So, what does the Qurultay's decision mean in this turmoil?

Crimea is being home for the Crimean Tatars for more than 800 centuries. The Crimean Tatars are the indigenous people of Crimea. They have settled down in the peninsula and accepted Islam under the Golden Horde in the thirteenth century. The independent Crimean Khanate was established from the mid-fifteenth century and stayed among the strongest powers in Eastern Europe until the beginning of the eighteenth century. Tsarina Catherine II annexed the Crimean Khanate in 1783. After the annexation, under pressure of Slavic colonization, Crimean Tatars began to immigrate to the Ottoman Empire. Particularly, after the Crimean War (1853-1856) huge numbers of the Tatars left Crimea and the first time the Crimean Tatars became the minority in their own lands.

After the Russian Revolution in 1917, Crimea became a part of the Soviet Union. During World War II, Crimea was occupied by Germany briefly. Although great number Crimean Tatar men served in the Red Army and took part in the partisan movement in Crimea could not save the Crimean Tatars from the deportation.

All Crimean Tatars were deported en masse, in form of collective punishment, on 18 May 1944 as special settlers to Uzbek SSR and to Siberia. 46.3% of the population died of the diseases and malnutrition.

Only 1967 did the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet revoke the charges of treason against the Crimean Tatars. Even after 1967, the Soviet government did not allow the Crimean Tatars to return to their homeland. Crimean Tatars, differing from other Soviet nations, having definite tradition of non-communist political dissent, succeeded in creating a truly independent network of activists, values and political experience created National Movement Organization.

Today, more than 250.000 Crimean Tatars have returned to their homeland, struggling to re-establish their lives and reclaim their national and cultural rights against many social and economic obstacles.

5. Wim Manuhutu

Shifting the balance: Cultural cooperation After Empire

In the agreement on the cultural cooperation between the Netherlands and Indonesia signed on 7 July 1968, the opening sentences state that both parties were 'desirous of strengthening the existing bonds of friendship between the peoples of their countries'. In the agreement on cultural cooperation between the Netherlands and Suriname of 5 February 1976 cultural cooperation was considered to be a means to achieve a better understanding between the peoples of both countries'.

Cultural cooperation between the Netherlands and its former colonies Indonesia and Suriname has both been a part and as well as a reflection of the repositioning within the former Dutch empire in the postwar period. At the Round Table Conference in 1949 that formally transferred sovereignty to Indonesia, cultural cooperation was included in the negotiations and outcome while it was explicitly included in the 1954 new Statuut voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden of which at that time Suriname was still a part.

This paper aims to analyze process leading to and the discourse surrounding the establishment of the cultural paragraphs at the Round Table Conference in 1949, the Statuut in 1954 and the cultural agreements of 1968 and 1975 in order to juxtapose the arguments and position of the various parties as a means to shed light on the perception of self and the other in a relation between former colonizer and colonized. The question of the feasibility of a Dutch Commonwealth based upon cultural cooperation will be raised in this paper.

Focusing on the role of cultural cooperation with former colonies and the restructuring of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in response to decolonization is an addition to our understanding of the development of postwar Dutch national identity formation.

The paper is based upon archival research of government departments and agencies as well as organizations and foundations aiming at cultural cooperation such as Sticusa and the professor Teeuw Fonds.

It is part of a Phd research on the development concept of mutual cultural heritage within the context of relations between the Netherlands, Indonesia and Suriname. The paper will reflect upon John Jansen van Galen's recent study on Dutch decolonization policy 'Afscheid van de Koloniën'⁴ while Paul Gilroy's 'After Empire'⁵ is

⁴ John Jansen van Galen, Afscheid van de Koloniën. Het Nederlandse dekolonisatiebeleid 1942-2012, Atlas Contact, Amsterdam/Antwerpen 2013

⁵ Paul Gilroy, After Empire. Melancholia or Convivial Culture?, Routledge, Abingdon 2004

discussed from a comparative perspective between post-colonial Great Britain and the Netherlands. Martin Shipway's 'Decolonization and its Impact'⁶ will be engaged to position the Netherlands within the broader European context.

6. Georgios Regkoukos

'Colonies' closer to home? Panslavism and the russification of Ukraine in the age of Gogol and Tchaikovsky (1820-1890)

It is well known that most of the existing etymological interpretations for the word 'Ukraine' are derived from the Slavic word for 'march' or 'borderland'. As a consequence, usage of the definite article which preceded the country's name in a number of European languages has been rendered politically incorrect, much like 'Little Russia', another banned designation. But it is little known that these controversial onomatopoeic practices date back to the Œcumenical Patriarchate's ecclesiastic administration in the 14th century or, more recently, to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Ironically, however, the name is sometimes wrongly associated with the borderlands of Russia. Also ironically, the annexation of Ukraine by the Russian Empire, as well as Ukraine's secession from the USSR, took place under entirely comparable circumstances and because of very similar (negative) motives. It is necessary therefore, in view of the latest developments, to insist upon the possibility that existing explanations of the difficult relationship between Ukraine and Russia do not suffice, as they do not challenge the notion of a diachronic and inescapable rivalry.

This paper discusses the policy of russification and notable instances of russophilia among intellectuals and artists in nineteenth-century Ukraine. Its aim is to uncover the causes behind today's deeply-rooted sympathies and antipathies by means of an interdisciplinary approach combining history, sociology and network analysis. As the land empire par excellence, Russia has over the centuries striven to maintain a policy of separation from its European neighbours by securing swathes of land to act as buffer zones. But how does this fit into the larger context of panslavism in the nineteenth century? What were the incentives for encouraging the colonisation of Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea during that time? By what means did russophilia seep into Ukraine's intellectual and artistic circles and how did it measure up to the rise of nationalisms in the wider region? Ukrainian nationalism and ruthenianism has thus far been studied with regard to Galicia, Austrian encouragement of ukrainophilia and an independent Ukraine. Yet the cross-current to the National Revival movement and the *hromada* networks also had very real, very tangible manifestations in contemporary literature and culture, manifestations securely anchored on strong ideological foundations and arguments found in a variety of Russian state and non-state sources.

⁶ Martin Shipway, *Decolonisation and its Impact. A Comparative Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires*, Blackwell, Malden/Oxford 2008

The main argument advanced in this paper is that from a structuralist perspective Russian colonisation of Ukraine was made possible, and allowed to endure, thanks to a rare organic fusion of two seemingly opposing ideologies (imperialism and internationalism), which in turn was made possible by common reference to ethnological (panslavism) and theological (sobornism) similarities between two peoples. Thus the approach of Ukraine's early modern history as that of a country caught between empires is largely abandoned and significant doubt is cast on the prevailing paradigm, which holds that the colonisation of Ukraine during that period came as a result of military conquest and the repressive measures taken by Russian authorities. This observation, in turn, may carry long-range implications for the analysis of recent developments and the future of Russian-speaking Ukraine.

7. Cynthia Scott

Renewing the “Special Relationship”: Dutch Cultural Cooperation as Development Aid in Suharto’s Indonesia

The independence of Asian and African countries in the aftermath of World War II brought with it claims for the return of cultural property from European museums, obtained during periods of colonial domination. For the Netherlands, such questions have troubled foreign policy-makers and cultural authorities from the time of independence negotiations with Indonesia from 1949 until today. However, by framing cultural relations with Indonesia in the late 1960s as part of the Netherlands' development aid, or development cooperation, initiatives, Dutch officials began to find a diplomatically productive way to deal with such demands. Writing on the emergence of culture as a factor in Dutch contributions to foreign development aid to Indonesia, for example, Susan Legêne and Els Postel-Coster have argued that good cultural relations between the two countries had initially been hampered by the history of colonial relations, and they traced the government's policy concerning the return of objects of Indonesian cultural property from Dutch museums as the primary example.⁷ This paper extends their research by asking how defining cultural relations with Indonesia as development aid not only helped Dutch officials deal with cultural property return demands in the face of a troubled colonial past, but that it supported them in shaping a celebratory vision of that past, as well as a positive future role for Dutch cultural authorities and institutions in Indonesia.

In addition to revealing the eagerness of Dutch officials to negotiate a new cultural relations agreement with Suharto's Indonesia, this paper will explore how defining cultural relations as development aid enabled both cultural cooperation and returns of cultural property to be seen as honoring the achievements of the colonial past, rather

⁷. Susan Legêne and Els Postel-Coster, “Isn't it all Culture? Culture and Dutch Development Policy in the Post-Colonial Period,” in *Fifty Years of Dutch Development Cooperation, 1949–1999*, ed. J.A. Nekkers and P.A.M. Malcontent (The Hague: SDU, 2000), 271–88.

than to be understood as gestures of remorse or admissions of historical wrong doing. In 1969, for example, when confronted with renewed claims for the return of materials from the “Lombok Treasure” held in the library of the University of Leiden, A. Teeuw (1921-2012), as Head of the Department of Language and Culture, helped frame an array of Dutch cultural activities as gestures of Dutch goodwill—steeped in colonial era learning. By aiming to improve Indonesia’s higher education and national repositories—before making politically difficult returns—Teeuw’s recommendations helped pave the way for an eventual refund of disputed cultural property on the best possible terms. In addition, while some Dutch officials believed that the colonial relationship had ended prematurely, they also thought that a new role for cultural authorities and institutions would help rectify problems that had developed during the Dutch absence in the 1950s and 1960s. Defining cultural relations as development cooperation, therefore, helped provide Dutch authorities new avenues to renew and, more importantly, to begin to correct what they saw as the “errors” of decolonization. By exploring the eagerness of Dutch authorities to frame cultural relations—and cultural property return—as development aid, therefore, this paper will illustrate that such cultural policies reflected deeper contributions officials made to national identity making and historical memory in the aftermath of decolonization.

8. Klaas Stutje

Indonesian nationalism from afar: A reinterpretation of the concept of *Long Distance Nationalism*

In 1992, long before Facebook, Twitter and Instagram connected the peoples of the world, Benedict Anderson, one of the arch fathers of nationalism studies, observed a new phenomenon among diasporic communities in the West: ‘email nationalism’ or ‘long distance nationalism’.⁸ From a safe distance in the First World, exiled communities such as Tamils in Britain, Croats in Australia or Kurds in Germany agitated fanatically for the liberation of their homeland, lobbied with foreign governments and even send money and guns to their compatriots back home.

The term long distance nationalism seems an invitation to scholars to theorize about the effects of extraterritoriality, migration and exile on national thinking, articulated through (hyper-)modern manifestations of print-capitalism. Moreover it fits in a recent trend in nationalism studies to emphasize the international context in which nation building processes take place.⁹ News events abroad inspire political movements at home, while extra-territorial diasporic communities of migrants, voyagers, and exiles spur national pride, and international networks and cooperation shape and enforce

⁸ Benedict Anderson, *Long-Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics* (Amsterdam 1992) 1-14.

⁹ Rebecca E. Karl, *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (Durham and London 2002); Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford 2007); Joep Leerssen, ‘Viral nationalism: romantic intellectuals on the move in nineteenth century Europe’, *Nations and Nationalism* 17 (2011).

the political project of the nation. Although the nation in itself is inherently 'limited', its emergence as a cultural and political identity is remarkably international.¹⁰

However, the 1992 essay in which Anderson first coined the term, is not neutral and remarkably negative in tone. Instead of opening a new field of research, he seems to condemn absentee nationalists, conducting politics 'without responsibility or accountability'.¹¹ In a revision of the article in 1998 Anderson even describes long distance nationalism as a 'probably menacing portent for the future'.¹² In my view, this negative framing is unproductive and obstructs further theorization on transnational forms of nationalism. In an attempt to assign more theoretical weight to the concept of long distance nationalism, I want to reexamine the effect of extraterritoriality on nationalist movements.

As a case in point I take the Indonesian student community in the Netherlands in the 1920s and 1930s. Traditionally, they are regarded as a pivotal group in the Indonesian nationalist movement, that brought forth many of the first generation leaders in postcolonial Indonesia. There is a strong suggestion that the 'Dutch' or 'European' experience determined their future prospects. However, the exact reason for this remains highly speculative and open for consideration. A survey of the many aspects involved will not only reposition this group, but will also provide more clarity to the concept of long distance nationalism in general.

¹⁰ Cf. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities, reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (London 1983, 2007) 7.

¹¹ Benedict Anderson, *Long-Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics* (Amsterdam 1992) 11.

¹² Benedict Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons. Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World* (London 1998) 74.