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1. Alberto Feenstra
Reliable sovereigns under deteriorating circumstances. The debt management of the Province of Zeeland during a period of economic decline.

Public finance is the outstanding area of interaction between economy and state formation. Finding adequate financial resources to pay for warfare required early modern sovereigns to reform the public finance, either by changing taxation or by borrowing money and often both. Indeed, increased borrowing in times of war created a public debt, which had to be served – and redeemed – with tax income in the long term. This paper addresses the public finance of the sovereign province of Zeeland during a period of economic decline, and more specifically how this province managed to maintained its debt throughout.

Indeed, notwithstanding deteriorating economic circumstances, the sovereign province of Zeeland honoured its debt throughout the eighteenth century. Moreover, to finance its deficits the province increasingly issued loans, which remarkably did not lead to higher, but instead, to declining interest rates. Hence, there was money available to finance Zeeland's budget, but this could not be obtained through increasing taxation, yet only by the use of the capital market. Consequently, Zeeland's financial survival depended heavily on its relation with the capital market.

This was, however, not the only option for keeping afloat the ship of state. Part of Zeeland's deficits was caused by its contribution to the central budget of the United Provinces, which the province deemed too high. The 50 per cent reduction, which the other provinces granted Zeeland in 1792, demonstrates that the rest of the Republic was convinced of the gravity of Zeeland's impoverishment. The revision of the quote system in 1792, which was the first revision since 1616, also shows the stability – or rigidity – of the relationship between the Seven Provinces that formed the Dutch Republic.

This paper argues that this institutional invariability and Zeeland's dependence on the capital market were related. The ability to issue loans at low and decreasing interest rates indicates that the province could tap into a capital surplus. However, the only option to collect these abundant funds was by borrowing, which signifies that the province was unable to break into the available wealth by taxation. Moreover, the low cost of capital reduced the pressure on public finance and hence limited the need to reform the organisation of taxation. In short, the urgency for institutional renewal was diminished by abundant and consequently cheap capital.

Furthermore, part of the provinces deficiencies was caused by the provinces contribution to the Generality, which opened the opportunity for negotiations to lower the expenditures of the provinces. If Zeeland were a completely independent state, it would not have had this option, but the institutional constellation of the Dutch Republic allowed to explore it – eventually successfully. Even though this took a long time to effectuate, the presence of the opportunity lessened the pressure for reforms. Hence, both the form of government and capital surplus explain the lack of institutional renewal within the province of Zeeland.

2. Klaas van Gelder
Governing Remote Regions: The Implications of Distance for the Establishment of Austrian Rule in the Southern Netherlands (1716-1740)

Scholars are increasingly aware of the impact of distance for establishing efficient administrations in Early Modern Europe. In political history, the so-called *Spatial Turn* helped to nuance the alleged absolutist character of Early Modern state apparatuses, and to identify the substantial problems to overcome the gap between rulers and subjects. The inherent weaknesses of the Ancien Régime monarchies have been stressed, leading to a revisionist historiography that sometimes even tends to underestimate the resilience and vigour of states and government structures.

In my presentation, I want to examine the impact of distance for the establishment of Austrian rule in the Southern Netherlands after the War of the Spanish Succession. Some 1100 kilometres separate Vienna and Brussels. In an age without cars or trains, let alone mobile phone or e-mail, under the best conditions a messenger needed a little less than a week to cover the distance between the two capitals. Bad weather conditions or political unrest easily led to reports or dispatches reaching their destination only after two or more weeks.

As a result, the Viennese court was always informed with a temporal delay, and was thus forced to formulate a policy based on data that at the very moment could be outdated. This was, however, a reality that the responsible office-holders were aware of, and which they took into consideration. To minimize the drawback of this distance, a constant influx of information from the Southern Netherlands was required. No fresh reports meant no adequate solution. On the other hand, a lack of Viennese orders could cause an uncertain minister in Brussels to hesitate, to postpone action, and thus pave the way for the erosion of princely power. Both situations occurred in the initial years of Austrian rule in the Southern Netherlands. It took Vienna quite some time to rearrange the information channels with Brussels, so as to solve this problem and to ensure adequate coverage from the Southern Netherlands. As a result, to the official but sometimes unsatisfactorily working sources of information were added parallel unofficial routes of correspondences to bypass the silence.

By presenting this case, I aim to stress the impact of spatial intervals and the material basis for information transfer, which are factors that should be borne in mind while studying Early Modern government. Moreover, distance was not only a problem between Brussels and Vienna, but to a lesser extent also within the Southern Netherlands or within the central European Habsburg lands, even on a very local level as recent studies have underlined. In my case, this sometimes added to the problem. However, I do not want to isolate the distance factor. This was clearly linked with other typical Early Modern state characteristics enhancing the agency of officials, such as vague instructions or scarcely delineated competencies. But even when rulers tried to overcome these, still distance played its role in defining limits of power within the often very dispersed territories of Early Modern monarchs.

3. Jean van de Maele
A failed attempt to build a modern state. On the office buildings for the Belgian ministries during the 1930s

Any modern government relies on the existence of a large number of public servants, who are charged with converting laws and policies into concrete administrative 'actions'. Logically, these public servants need to be housed in convenient offices (and office buildings), where the administrative tasks can be carried out efficiently. However, during the first half of the twentieth century, these conditions were largely absent in many European countries – including Belgium. More often than not, Belgian ministries and government agencies were located in old mansion houses,

which were badly adapted to office work (being too small, worn-out, and gloomy), and which were scattered throughout the national capital (hampering easy communication between different services). During the 1930s, this situation was increasingly perceived as detrimental for the efficiency and the prestige of the state, while consecutive governments were accused by the extreme right of being incompetent in tackling the economic crisis. As a countermeasure, the Belgian centre-right Prime Minister Paul van Zeeland decided in 1936-37 to implement a large-scale 'administrative reform' of all public services. To this end, Van Zeeland appointed Louis Camu, a relatively young and tremendously ambitious public servant, as Commissaire Royal à la Réforme Administrative. The Van Zeeland-Camu reform was aimed at 'rationalising' the administrative procedures, by eliminating superfluous staff members, and by enforcing a rigorous work ethic. Simultaneously, the reform targeted the superseded patrimony of government office buildings, by proposing the erection of a grand new office complex, in which all ministries had to be centralised. Elaborate plans for this so- called Cité Administrative were made by the functionalist architects Jean-Jules Eggericx and Raphaël Verwilghen, although a lack of funds and the outbreak of the Second World War caused the project to be left unbuilt.

In my talk for the conference, I will attempt to analyse the architectural plans of the Commissariat Royal à la Réforme Administrative, looking at them as a historian with a strong interest in political and social topics. This way, it will become clear that Camu, Eggericx, and Verwilghen sought to provide clear-cut solutions for questions on architectural representation: in their view, the state had to 'affirm' itself proudly in the streetscape and cityscape, by constructing advanced, modernist buildings. Simultaneously, Camu's team strongly propagated the 'rationalist' ideology of scientific management, which was perceived as a comprehensive strategy for improving the output of the civil servants. Moreover, Camu believed that these officials were in permanent need of surveillance: the public services were to be totally 'transparent' institutions, and Camu even wanted the public to partake in observing the course of events. This way, architectural schemes (and the ideological premises therein) were to become instrumental for the creation of a completely 'new' public service, which was to be everything the contemporary public service was not: efficient, modern, performant, reliable, and trustworthy.

4. Karen van Nieuwenhuyze
Using and Producing Urban Political Space: J.F. Loos in formal and informal Antwerp

For a long time, political history and urban history developed separately. The first traditionally focused on national political evolutions, while the second considered the urban space as a determining factor in socio-economic, cultural and political processes. Despite the spatial turn of the 1970s and 1980s in human sciences and the growing importance of local and urban political traditions in political history, this latter still all too often ignores the direct link between political culture and urban space.

In their studies on visual and material political symbols, such as parades and public sculptures, historians rarely consider the spatial influence on or embedding of these elements. However, political institutions, parties and individuals involved both the physical and mental space to underline and expand their ideology, power and identity. By defining seven types of urban political space, the Dutch historian Pim Kooij intended to close the gap between the two disciplines. Around the 'epicentral

political space' or the zenith of the urban political power, mostly situated in the historical centre of the city (town hall, Great Market), six other political spaces are concentrated in which this power is supported, expanded, challenged or opposed. The struggle for political power and influence took place in a space that not only functioned as a passive background, but was above all assigned an active role by the political elite.

First as councillor and later as alderman and mayor, the liberal Jan Frans Loos was an important figure of the 19th-century Antwerp political world. Besides, he also built up a successful commercial career and actively participated in the cultural life of the city. He was, among other things, director of the well-known transport company Van Gend & Loos, member of the Chamber of Commerce, founder and director of the Royal Zoological Society of Antwerp and founder and honorary president of the *cercle artistique, littéraire et scientifique d'Anvers*. The Royal Zoological Society, for example, constructed a natural history museum and some animal cages in the fifth district *extra-muros*, just outside the 16th-century Spanish walls, but inside the area of the military building ban. With this well-considered location, Loos not only made a pragmatic choice – the train station was situated in the same quarter – but probably also a political statement in the future fight against the demolition of the old obsolete Spanish.

The case of Loos is a clear example of how members of the political elite, in particular of the Antwerp city council, tried to enlarge their political power by using existing and producing new urban space(s). Loos' directorship, chairmanship and membership of these companies and associations undoubtedly helped him to enlarge his political power over a larger territory, both in formal and informal ways. After all, these societies were important meeting places for prominent, often political, figures and thus places where political ideologies could be exchanged and emanated.

5. Marijcke Schillings
Social networks and state formation in the Netherlands during the first half of the 19th century

This abstract describes a research study in its initial phase. The proposed research will focus on the importance of personal social networks to state formation in the Netherlands during the first half of the 19th century. The central question is what role social networks have fulfilled in the establishment of the new Dutch state after the Napoleonic era. In order to answer this central question, three prominent figures of the period - all mutual acquaintances - were selected. They are: Anton Reinhard Falck (1777-1843, minister and diplomat), Johannes van den Bosch (1780-1844, army officer, commissioner-general of the Netherlands West Indies, governor-general of the Netherlands East Indies) and Willem de Clercq (1795-1844, grain dealer, director of the Nederlandsche Handels Maatschappij). They all held senior political and administrative posts – key positions in society. They recorded their ideas in official documents, correspondences and publications. They fulfilled key roles within national and transnational networks. Even though they did not represent the whole of Dutch civil society, they did have connections with other groups or strata in society, e.g. in the southern part of Willem I's kingdom.

The concepts of personal social network and state formation constitute the framework for this research. Societies, fraternities, movements, journal editors etc.,

can connect these two 'pillars' together. Examples of this intermediate level, a sphere separate from the state, are freemasonry (Falck), the Maatschappij van Weldadigheid (Van den Bosch), the Maatschappij ter bevordering van het godsdienstig onderwijs onder slaven en kleurlingen in Suriname (Van den Bosch) and the Protestant Réveil (De Clercq).

It is my intention to elaborate one small case study, i.e. one pilot study, for the conference paper. Economic and social policy towards the colonies in the East and West Indies during the 1820s is a relevant factor in state formation, as well as an area in which Falck, Van den Bosch and De Clercq played a role. On a more detailed level, the following question is relevant: what persons, publications or events inside and outside the Low Countries might or might not have been sources of inspiration for their body of ideas regarding the colonies? The year 1825 from the *Journal of Willem de Clercq* will be used as the source for this pilot study. [1]

6. Pieter Slaman

The student's state. Political history of public student support policies in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1815-2015

Throughout modern history, Dutch governments have used financial student support policies as instruments for influencing major developments in Dutch society. The two decades after the establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1813-1815 were no exception. In this period, student support was used to strengthen the popular support for the newly founded state.

King William I of Orange, who ruled in the period 1813 to1840, was allowed by the Congress of Vienna to rule a territory the size of modern day Luxemburg, Belgium, the Netherlands and its colonies. His kingdom was a new, highly artificial state containing populations with different identities divided by religion, culture and history. Like the eighteenth century enlightened despots before him, William I tried to unite these groups under his rule into one nation, industrious, tolerant and loyal to the crown. He wanted all his subjects to accept his rule and to think and feel as fellow Dutchmen. On top of that, he envisioned a merger of the Roman Catholic church and the different forms of Protestantism within his kingdom into one unified national church under his own leadership.

These ambitious projects demanded a change of beliefs and attitudes among his subjects, especially in the Belgian, mainly Catholic south. Convinced of enlightened notions of upbringing and education, king William believed his

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government to be capable of shaping the population's cultural and spiritual life. However, government could not accomplish this by itself. It needed the only two institutions that had authority and proximity to all ranks of society: the school and the church. That's why government invested in the training of a large body of enlightened, patriotic and royalist priests, preachers and teachers. Public financial support was granted to young men and even women who wished to take part in this project.   However, the Roman catholic church hardly cooperated. Annoyed by this, king William founded a public training institute for catholic priests. He took a part of the church's private endowments and turned them into student grants for his new public training program. This attempt to attract students failed because the graduates of this training were refused as clergymen by the church of Rome.

This struggle for control over the training of priests ended up in a total loss for the king. It had cost him a lot of credit among his southern subjects and contributed in its way to the Belgian revolt in 1830. This episode in the history of Dutch student grant policies shows how student support could be used as a policy instrument for the formation of a Dutch state and nation, as it was for many different political purposes in later periods. It also shows the limitations to the usefulness of such an instrument, and even limitations to the power of the state as a whole.

7. Tamás Székely
Nation- and state-building in Austria-Hungary 1867-1914

The so-called "Ausgleich" of 1867, namely the compromise between Emperor Franz Joseph and the Hungarian elites opened a new chapter in the long history of the Habsburg Monarchy. After decades of unsuccessful revolutions, various separatist, absolutist and federalist ideas, attempts and movements a new, herewith a dualistic type of state had been established on the foundations of an age-long dynastical empire. In the deep the Monarchy still remained a multi-ethnical historical conglomerate which at first view resembles rather a postmodern Super-state than a classical (pre)modern Nation-state. In regard of the many nationalities and ethnic groups living within the empire, it seems more than appropriate to talk about parallel but asynchronous nation-building processes. But what could we say about the state-building developments of the Dual Monarchy?

Although, on the field of diplomacy and international relations the Monarchy was often regarded as simple as Austria or at best as Austria-Hungary, the common institutions of foreign and military policy did not require a common and comprehensive state-building mechanism; not to mention the historical and structural differences between Trans- and Cisleithania. Then again, the dual division of the empire would also have been a rather weak explanation for an evidently dual state-building development, because in both parts of the empire we can find examples of sub-state governance and anti-state tendencies. Therefore it seems reasonable to characterize the Austro-Hungarian developments as conjunction of hierarchical and synchronous state-building processes.

In order to draw a panoramic view, it is worth to group the different tendencies based on our political history and nation-building knowledge.

(1) The first group could be called "Austrian" and would refer to the central state-building attempts evolved in Cisleithania. It was inspired by the primacy and heritage of the Habsburg dynasty and tried to integral the German, Czech, Polish, Sloven and Ukrainian society confronting their own cultural, ethnic and linguistic nationalisms.

(2) The second group is the "Hungarian" and it refers to the central state-building attempt evolved in Transleithania. It was inspired by the historical heritage and concept of "the lands of St.Stephen's Holy Crown" and idea of the "ethnically diverse but politically unified Hungarian nation" despite the multi-ethnical (Romanian, Croatian, Slovak, Jewish, German) character of the country.

(3) The third group could be called "Sub-state self-governance" and would refer to those regions which regained more or less autonomous status within the Austrian or Hungarian states. The best examples are the Croatian and Czech cases, and it is not a coincidence, that those nations were particularly interested in transforming the "dualism" into "trialism".

(4) The fourth group could be called "Pseudo-state-building" or "Shadow-state-building". It would refer to the extremely complex and unique Bosnian, Polish and Transylvanian cases.